

MEMORANDUM FOR: *DDC*

Attached are revised pieces of the DCI Briefing Book for the NSPG meeting on 30 November. Please remove the older materials and replace them with the new materials in the appropriate place. Thanks.



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Date 29 Nov 84

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1:45 P.M., 30 November 1984

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CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1984

Soviet Goals and Expectations at Geneva

While they have agreed in principle to begin new arms control talks, the Soviets appear concerned that the US is interested more in the appearance of negotiations than in addressing specific Soviet concerns, particularly in the area they have identified as a priority concern--outer space. Moreover, having reversed their intransigent position of refusing to enter into further arms control negotiations until US LRINF are removed from Europe, and, in their perspective, taken the initiative for beginning talks, the Soviets may now believe that they are once again well-positioned to put the US on the political defensive in the public arena. [REDACTED]

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Thus, the Soviets most likely view the Geneva meeting as an opportunity to ascertain whether the US is prepared to engage in substantive bargaining on terms that Moscow can live with. In particular, Gromyko will want to determine whether the US is prepared to discuss concrete limitations on space weapons before committing the USSR to formal negotiations on offensive arms reductions. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko will also expect to hear a clarification of the US proposal for "umbrella" talks. While cautiously exploring US proposals, Gromyko likely will have his own ideas as to the modalities for the negotiations and a politically based agenda to include the goal of halting the arms race, particularly in space weaponry. A key objective of the Soviet emphasis on "demilitarizing" space is to undermine support for US strategic defense, in general, and the SDI, in particular. The Soviets probably see a distinct possibility that through a combination of arms control efforts, their active measures campaign, independent political and budget pressures within the US, and pressure from US Allies, the Administration's efforts to obtain congressional funding for SDI will be impeded and the program curtailed. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko will give priority to negotiations on space weapons. He will seek further clarification of the Administration's offer to consider "appropriate mutual restraints" during the negotiations and seek US commitment to an ASAT moratorium before specific negotiations begin. He probably will indicate that progress on the demilitarization of space will facilitate reaching an agreement on offensive nuclear arms and may go as far to suggest that an agreement on strategic nuclear arms cannot be achieved absent an agreement on space weapons. The Soviets probably view the goal of blocking US ASAT testing, which they consider integral to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as being more urgent than reaching an agreement on limiting offensive nuclear arms. They may hope to use US interest in a strategic arms control accord as bargaining leverage to achieve their negotiating objectives on space weapons. Gromyko may argue that the implementation of SDI will undermine the ABM Treaty and he might assert that any future arms control agreement depends on maintaining the integrity of this agreement. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets are well positioned in the near term to compete militarily in the arena of strategic offensive arms. Nonetheless, we believe they still attach priority, both for political and military reasons, to the maintenance of negotiated constraints on US nuclear forces. They have expressed concern that the US might abandon SALT II restrictions when the treaty expires next year. Gromyko may seek a mutual reaffirmation that the sides will continue to observe the treaty constraints until a new agreement can be negotiated. He may indicate that a new strategic arms agreement is possible, providing that basic framework of the SALT II Treaty is taken as point of departure.

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While the Soviets may offer some adjustments to their current strategic arms control proposals, they are unlikely to demonstrate significant flexibility on the fundamental issues which divide the US and USSR in the START and INF negotiations unless perhaps the US makes a significant concession on SDI or ASAT. They are likely to insist that French and British nuclear systems must be taken into account "somewhere" in the negotiations, to resist US attempts to reduce their heavy ICBM missile force, and reject proposals calling for on site inspection. On INF, they have dropped their precondition that US INF missiles be withdrawn before negotiations begin but are likely to press for a monitoring on further deployments and a commitment that a reversal of those deployments can be negotiated. Gromyko may suggest that a ban on long range sea-launched cruise missiles (SCLMs) is no longer feasible in light of US deployments and press for a US agreement to negotiate a limit on these systems.

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The Soviets will have a clear-cut idea of their own as to the format and modalities of the negotiations. Gromyko may wait for the US to show its hand and describe the "umbrella" proposal but the other "concrete ideas" we have told them we are prepared to discuss before making concrete counter-proposals. The Soviets may envisage two sets of negotiations--one on space weapons and one on nuclear arms--the characterization which they used in the joint communique. Chernenko has stated that these are "interconnected" issues, possibly hinting that negotiations will be successful only if progress is made in both arenas.

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Until the Soviets are satisfied on the subject and objectives of further negotiations, the Soviets may see some utility in having an extended series of foreign ministers meetings in lieu of formal negotiations. They might calculate that under these circumstances, public expectations in the United States and Western Europe would increase pressure on the Administration to make "good faith" gestures of unilateral restraint.

- The Soviets may hope to stimulate further domestic and congressional pressure to postpone ASAT testing in the interest of reaching an ASAT agreement with the Soviet Union.
- The Soviets may view the Dutch basing decision in November and recent political discord in Belgium over the INF issue as offering opportunities to derail US deployments in those countries.

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- Gromyko is scheduled in March to visit the Netherlands and possibly Belgium and the FRG, and he may propose a moratorium on further US INF deployments in return for a freeze or possibly unilateral reductions in the Soviet SS-20 force in the European USSR.

At this meeting with the Secretary, Gromyko may touch on other arms control issues, possibly calling for the ratification of existing treaties on nuclear testing and a resumption of the comprehensive test ban negotiations. He will also probably revive the Soviet call for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons testing and deployments during negotiations and call on the US to sign a no first use declaration. [REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06641-84  
26 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: The Soviets Grab the Umbrella

1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the stone-wall policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:

The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF deployments.

The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.

President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of "playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.

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Washington is in the throes of political battle which will determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet political tactics.

Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior in the next four years.

Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.

2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments. They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process that follows.

3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced, according to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course, it is now time to rejoin the game.

4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the Soviet decision.

5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far, it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.

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
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6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. With arms control talks once again in prospect or progress, the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.

7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try -- is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign, military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for this Soviet leadership.

  
Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachment: As Stated

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NIO/USSR

DCI/NIO MEETING  
21 NOVEMBER 1984SOVIET DESIRE FOR ARMS TALKS TO INFLUENCE US DEFENSE PROGRAMS

A primary Kremlin objective in the near term will be to elicit US participation in arms control talks. In the context of the Soviets' long term strategy of using arms control as another instrument to gain and maintain advantages, they probably believe the next six months are a particularly important window for influencing US defense programs. The neo-Brezhnevite leadership, which regularly recalls with fondness detente as practiced in the early 1970s, probably believes that a positive arms control dialogue can influence the Congress and others to treat US defense issues with lesser urgency.

- o They now want to maximize pressure on the Congress to cut defense spending as we come to grips with the deficit.
- o They may believe SDI and the MX are particularly vulnerable.
- o They probably hope that a setback to US military spending this year would halt and even reverse the momentum of the Administration's defense program over the next several years.

The Soviets are further interested to undermine US defense spending at this time because of their serious economic problems and aversion to major economic restructuring. They are at or near the end of a long economic policy cul de sac, and the implications for their defense goals are bad. Saturday's Washington Post article relating that Chernenko called for a boost in Soviet defense spending at last week's expanded Politburo meeting was wrong.

- o What was noteworthy about Chernenko's comments was how little he said about defense spending and the near backhanded treatment he did give it.
- o The speech was replete with lamentation about Soviet economic difficulties and exhortation to overcome these problems.
- o Chernenko's preaching on behalf of consumers denotes considerable concern to improve living standards and, implicitly, even some anxiety about public feelings toward the regime.
- o Editorials in Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda in September suggested a leadership decision against diverting resources from consumer programs to defense, and a more recent Novoye Vremya article explaining the Soviet defense budget had a very defensive tone.

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Arms talks leading to reduced US defense programs would reduce the pressure on the Soviets to divert scarce resources to defense and allow the Soviets greater leeway to deal with their economic problems.

Moscow, in its desire for a negotiation on SDI, probably is resigned to talks that also include INF. Because the Soviets now want to improve the East-West climate and prospects for talks, they did not claim that the US ASAT test last week violated the terms of their current test moratorium or otherwise condemn it vitriolically. Insofar as their momentary concern is to restart and politically utilize the arms talks process, they probably are not now focussing as much on possible outcomes. This may be particularly true of Chernenko, whose words and tones -- in the Washington Post interview and the more recent one with NBC -- hail directly from the Brezhnev school of moderate, placating rhetoric.

The Soviets also are likely to utilize high level visits and exchanges to foster a positive climate. These may include:

- o A possible visit to Moscow by Secretary Shultz.
- o A visit to Moscow by a US trade delegation in January.

A corollary to Soviet interest in arms talks and other diplomatic instruments as a means of influencing US defense programs, and relatedly US domestic attitudes toward international affairs generally, is a probable disinclination among the leadership at this time to act provocatively toward the US.

- o This would seem to be a time when the Kremlin would not send MiGs to Nicaragua.
- o This might be a good time for the Allies to press the Soviets to curtail their restrictions on access to Berlin.

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1984 / PAGE 3A

# 19 Soviet violations on weapons listed by White House report

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House will inform Congress this weekend that there have been a total of 19 Soviet violations of nuclear arms control agreements — a dozen more than were reported in January, administration officials said yesterday.

The report will reinforce the January conclusion that there has been "a disturbing pattern" of Soviet arms control violations through the years, said the officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In a letter being prepared for delivery by a Saturday deadline requested by Congress, White House national security adviser Robert McFarlane will inform Congress of the violations, the officials said.

Congressional sources said the letter will be accompanied by a classified "interim report" of the violations, which will not be made public until February. The conference report on this year's defense authorization bill called for a report to be made public by Dec. 1.

The new administration report is in addition to one done by a White House sponsored panel of outside experts — the General Advisory Committee on Disarmament.

Made public last month, the GAC committee report found 17 violations over the last 25 years and 10 further "suspicions of material breach." Many of the GAC violations overlap those found in the official administration reports, officials said.

## State...feared the report would lessen support for arms control agreements

Release of the new violations report, the congressional sources said, has been fought by the State Department which feared the report would lessen congressional and public support for new arms control agreements with the Soviets.

Even though the Saturday deadline has not been met completely, some congressional conservatives see the letter and the secret report as a victory.

"The White House response represents a solid victory for the senators who have insistently lobbied for the report for several years now," said Sen. Steve Symms, R-Idaho, in a statement.

He said the American people deserve to know if the Soviets have been meeting their obligations to world peace.

White House spokesman Robert Sims confirmed that a letter is being prepared for Mr. McFarlane informing Congress that an analysis of 12 additional possible violations is under way.

Mr. Sims did not know if a description of the 12 additional "issues" would be included in the letter or even would accompany it. The analysis has not yet been completed, Mr. Sims said. He said the additional violations would be officially reported to Congress in February.

Since the Dec. 1 deadline was included only in a conference report and not in legislation, it did not have the force of law, and was more of a "request" by Congress, Mr. Sims said.

In the authorization bill itself, which has the force of law, Congress required the administration to inform it by Feb. 15 of Soviet compliance with the 1972 ABM treaty and the 1979 Salt II agreement. (Both nations have said they would comply with Salt II even though it has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate as a formal treaty.)

Mr. Sims said the administration felt it was therefore complying with the law and demonstrating a good faith effort to meet the request of Congress.

Other officials described the 12 additional violations being analyzed as:

- Limited test ban treaty violations.
- The building of movable anti-ballistic missile radars, not allowed under the 1972 ABM treaty.
- The testing of surface-to-air missile radars and interceptors in an ABM mode, also forbidden under the 1972 treaty.
- The prohibited "rapid reload" of missile interceptors.
- Production of Backfire manned bombers at a rate above the 30 per month called for in the Salt II agreement.
- Provision for more than the 10 warheads on the giant SS-18 missile agreed on in the Salt II accord.
- Soviet failure to dismantle the total number of nuclear delivery vehicles called for in Salt II.
- The testing of a "heavy" submarine-launched ballistic missile — the SSN-23 — in violation of Salt II.
- The stationing and refueling of Backfire bombers in the Arctic in violation of Salt II.
- Plans to station the Backfire in Cuba in violation of the so-called Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement after the 1963 Cuban missile crisis.
- Violation of the Salt II multiple warhead ceiling by the recent deployment of the new SS-25 ICBM, capable of carrying three warheads, and the anticipated deployment soon of the SS-24, which will be able to carry 10 nuclear warheads.
- The jamming of U.S. satellites and radars monitoring Soviet missile tests, monitoring needed to verify the number of warheads a missile can carry as well as other characteristics.

— Walter Andrews